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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A
DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW AND DOMESTIC




We have before us an extraordinary moment in the history of the
human rights movement-a window of opportunity to gain universal ac-
ceptance of guarantees for individual freedoms. Now that curiosity is
aroused, one must wonder what possible miracle cure has been devised
and why no one told you about it. Simple. We're talking international
human rights. Of course the reaction of "real" lawyers to mention of
such a concept is likely to be one of puzzlement or the tolerant but cyni-
cal smile that is supposed to distinguish the realist from the idealist.
Since the term is usually employed as a generic phrase and bandied about
rather loosely by politicians and the like, it is not surprising that some
confusion exists. Accordingly, we must add the word "law" to qualify
this window of opportunity.
International human rights law is today an extensive body of agreed-
upon norms and international obligations codified in over 50 interna-
tional treaties and declarations of both a general and fairly specialized
nature. United States lawyers and judges are turning with increasing fre-
quency to these laws as a basis for rules of decision and as interpretive
guides in domestic cases involving refugees, detainees, undocumented
aliens, and government activities. The time is ripe for enhanced develop-
ment and application of a variety of human rights issues through ratifica-
tion of Several treaties currently pending before the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee including The Convention Against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment; The International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; The International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and
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The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women. Altogether, there are over forty international human
rights treaties now pending in the Senate.
This article will attempt to provide both the realist and idealist with a
general understanding of international human rights law, together with
the whys and wherefores of how such treaties may be albe to significantly
contribute to American jurisprudence. Particular focus will be on the
impact that ratification of select treaties could have on the federal and
North Carolina criminal justice systems. Anticipating ratification, we
will explore the background and development of codified international
human rights law-the evolutionary process that has set the stage for the
upcoming senatorial deliberations with respect to these treaties. The
mechanics of treaty and legislative ratification will also be examined to
acquaint the reader with procedural aspects of a subject so often left out
of the typical law school curriculum: public international law.
BACKGROUND
A. Aliens and the Red Cross
Although most observers regard the formation of the United Nations
and the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as
the beginning of international human rights law, the origins of human
rights can be traced to early philosophical and legal theories of "natural
law" or "God's law," a law higher than the substantive laws of states.
Such theories gave individuals certain immutable rights as human beings
that commanded moral obedience, even when the right in question con-
flicted with positive laws enacted by the state. During the nineteenth
century, however, the concept that states were the only proper subjects of
international law gained acceptance. Though the state-oriented view
granted individuals no international legal status, several other develop-
ments presaged the modern protection of human rights. The Hague
Convention No. IV on the rules of war adopted in 1907, the establish-
ment of the International Labor Organization in 1919, the efforts to abol-
ish slavery and the slave trade, and the diplomatic efforts to protect the
rights of aliens all served to set the stage for contemporary human rights
law.1
The specific protection of aliens is particularly significant, because we
are confronted with an "international standard of justice" for the first
time. Alien concern grew out of the concept of state sovereignty,
whereby a nation may demand respect for the rights of its nationals
1. See e.g. Hannum, International Human Rights Law: Neither Myth nor Magic, 31 FED.
NEW & J. 19 (1984).
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abroad.2 Although initial enforcement of this right was in the form of
self-help reprisal, diplomatic negotiation between the government of the
aggrieved individual and the government of the territory where the
wrong occurred evolved as a suitable replacement. This state interven-
tion rested on an alien's right to be treated in accordance with interna-
tional standards of justice and to get the same protection as nationals of
the country in which the alien was residing.3
Concern for human rights likewise motivated the formation of the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the 1863 Geneva In-
ternational Conference. The ICRC was instrumental in preparing the
initial draft of the first multilateral treaty protecting the victims of armed
conflict known as: the Geneva Convention of 1864 for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field.' This
international treaty protected military hospitals from attack and pro-
vided equal medical treatment for combatants on both sides of a
conflict.'
Following World War II, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 sup-
plemented the 1864 Convention. The first three conventions provide for
the care of sick and wounded members of the armed forces and for the
treatment of prisoners of war.6 The fourth extends protection to civilians
in time of war.7 In 1974, the ICRC initiated a conference to draft two
protocols intended to update and clarify the Geneva Conventions and to
modernize the rules limiting methods and means of warfare. As a result,
the two additional Protocols of 1977 were adopted and added to the 1949
Conventions. The Protocols attempted to combine the Geneva Conven-
tions' focus on the protection of war victims with the Hague Conven-
tions' concern with the rules for waging war. Emerging from the
adoption were certain humanitarian rights conferred upon both individ-
ual combatants and civilians. Combatants are given prisoner-of-war sta-
tus once they are placed outside of battle by becoming sick, wounded,
2. See L. JOHN, AND T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
at 6-7 (1973).
3. Tarnopolosky, General Course on International Protection of Human Rights, in INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COLLECTION OF LECTURES 1, 9 (1984).
4. A. ROBERTS & R. CUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR (1982) (The ICRC also
participated in drafting the Geneva Conventions of 1906, 1929 and 1949, and the Additional Proto-
cols of 1977.)
5. See Weissbrodt & O'Toole, The Development of International Human Rights Law, in THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1948-1988: HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED NA-
TIONS AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 17 (1988).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 21. (Note that fifteen Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 emphasize limits on the
means and methods of waging warfare. For example, the Hague Conventions outlaw the use of
weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, i.e. active combatants are given the right not to
be targets of biological, bacteriological, or chemical weaponry.)
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shipwrecked, or by voluntarily laying down their arms.9
The Geneva Conventions also established a minimum international
standard for securing the life, liberty, and property of civilians in occu-
pied territories. Civilians were given certain minimal human rights, in-
cluding the right to be free from torture, mutilation, destruction of
cultural objects and places of worship, and the taking of hostages."
With the United States as a signatory and ratifying nation, the Geneva
Conventions may serve to be the most effective source of international
humanitarian law. Unfortunately, utility is extremely limited due to the
parochial nature of circumstances necessary for application of the provi-
sions, i.e. human rights violations do not limit their occurrence to periods
of declared warfare.
B. Minority Protection and The Abolition of Slavery
Between 1680 and 1786, British slave traders transported more than
two million Blacks to the western hemisphere.11 Collective international
measures were taken to demonstrate the growing international concern
for minority human rights until the nineteenth century. After centuries
of involuntary servitude, opposition to this traffic gradually developed,
and the slave trade was finally condemned by treaty in the Additional
Articles to the Paris Treaty of 1814 between France and Great Britain.'2
In 1885, the General Act of the Berlin Conference on Central Africa
affirmed that the trading of slaves was to be forbidden in conformity with
the principles of international law."3 These beginnings set the stage for
the League of Nations Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slav-
ery of 1926. The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery aug-
mented the League of Nations Convention when adopted in 1956."
International standards of justice also developed in early efforts to pro-
tect religious minorities. Beginning with the Reformation and the reli-
gious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, peace treaties began to include
provisions protecting religious minorities.15 Though diplomatic alterna-
tives were less intrusive, many countries used humanitarian purposes as
excuses for military intervention in an effort to punish states abusing
their minorities. Such sovereign intrusions were thought to be justified
9. See Erickson, Protocol I: A Merging of the Hague and Geneva Law of Armed Conflict, 19
VA. J. INT'L L. 557, 573 (1979).
10. Id.
11. Weissbrodt & O'toole, supra note 5, at 19.
12. See Zoglin, United Nations Action Against Slavery: A Critical Evaluation, 8 HuM. RTS. Q.
306 (1986).
13. P. SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS, § 1.7, at 13 (1983).
14. Id. § 18.4.6, at 233-34.
15. Tarnopolsky, supra note 3, at 10-13.
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when a government's treatment of its subjects shocked the conscience of
humankind. 6 For example, Great Britain, France, and Russia described
their military excursion in 1827 against the Ottoman Empire as neces-
sary to stop Turkish abuse of its Greek population.17
A common-sense approach, similar to modern day United Nations
methods of addressing minority human rights problems, was advanced
by nations who regarded diplomatic intervention as an appropriate
means to express concern over another government's treatment of minor-
ities. The United States and six European nations utilized this tactic by
sending a collective diplomatic note to the government of Romania in
1872 protesting Romanian mistreatment of jews. 8 Such measures ex-
hibit more genuine respect for another respected principle of interna-
tional human rights, that of self-determination. This principle became
one of the basic components of minority protection treaties administered
by the League of Nations, which created a mandate system to guarantee
freedom of conscience and religion in the former colonial terrorities of
Germany and Turkey. 9 Mandatory powers promoted the material and
moral well-being as well as the social progress of the inhabitants of man-
date territories. 20 The goal of the system was to prepare the former colo-
nies for independence; they were considered prepared for independence
when protections of religious, linguistic, and ethnic minorities were guar-
anteed. Also, protection for alien rights and freedom of conscience were
notable prerequisites for autonomy.
C. Human Rights in National Law
Perhaps the most obvious evolutionary recognition of human rights
was the development of charters and proclamations within individual na-
tion states that, at least in theory, codified inherent civil rights applicable
to all citizens. The best example of this is, perhaps, our own Declaration
of Independence and Bill of Rights. When the American colonies re-
belled against Great Britain, the rebels set forth their reasons in the Dec-
laration as follows:
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men
are created equal; that they are endowed, by their
Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, gov-
ernments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed."
16. L. JOHN & T. BVERGENTHAL, supra note 2, at 181.
17. Tarnopolsky, supra note 3, at 12.
18. Weissbrodt & O'Toole, supra note 5, at 19.
19. L. JOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 2, at 337-69.
20. See Weissbrodt & Mahoney, International Legal Action Against Apartheid, 4 L. & INE-
QUALITY 485, 489 (1986).
19921
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Great rhetoric, but black citizens were still slaves and all women were
disenfranchised and deprived of important liberties. Still, rhetoric has a
way of shaping reality, and the twentieth century America is closer to the
ideals of the Declaration than it was in 1776.
European governments followed suit, beginning with France in 1789
when the French Revolution brought forth the Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of the Citizen. Similar written were promulgated in the
Netherlands (1798), Sweden (1809), Spain (1812), Norway (1814),
Belgium (1831), Liberia (1847), Sardinia (1848), Denmark (1849) and
Prussia (1850).21 The development of socialism in the nineteenth century
expanded the concept to include not only the right to be free from state
intervention but, also, the right to have the states redress economic ine-
quality. These economic, social and cultural rights were first incorpo-
rated into the constitutions of Mexico (1917) and the Soviet Union
(1918).22
Following World War I and the resulting territorial changes, nine Eu-
ropean nations and the principal allied powers entered into treaties that
provided protection for racial, linguistic and religious minorities. These
instruments required signatory states to guarantee within their own na-
tional law that the civil rights of minorities would be protected and that
these protections could not be modified by ordinary legislation; these
guarantees were theoretically sound but impractical. Despite increased
protection within the international community, the concept of national
sovereignty effectively limited the extent to which other nations could
criticize a government's treatment of its nationals, resulting Nazi atroci-
ties and World War II. Certainly, within the international legal frame-
work present at the time, Hitler plausibly could have argued that the
treatment of its own citizens was not a matter of international concern.
Likewise, other governments could have refused intervention because
they were not responsible for the conduct of the German government.
The United Nations and an "International Bill of Rights"
Forty-two years ago, governments set a new world standard for human
rights-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, the Declara-
tion proclaims fundamental and equal rights for all human kind and pro-
vides a worldwide standard for the preservation of human equality and
dignity. This action, prompted by the Holocaust, marked universal rec-
ognition by the United States and other United Nations' members of the
necessity to protect human rights in the global arena.
Soon after its founding in San Francisco in 1945, the United Nations
21. P. SIEGHART, supra note 13 § 1.3, at 9 n. 11.
22. Weissbrodt & O'Toole, supra note 5, at 21.
[Vol. 20:1
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began receiving letters about human rights violations. The question of
these petitions led to the creation of the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, originally chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt. After the Commission
began operation, the Secretary of the United Nations prepared an outline
that listed most of the rights of which the Universal Declaration would
eventually consist. This outline was followed by a draft that drew upon
national constitutions and texts created by both governmental and non-
governmental organizations. Suggestions were submitted by entities such
as the Sub-Commission on Freedom and Information, Commission on
the Status of Women, and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities. These groups were catalysts
for agreement on the final format just two days before the end of the
U.N. General Assembly Session. Adoption was "a much greater
achievement than anyone could have imagined," wrote John P.
Humphrey, first director of the United Nations Division of Human
Rights.23 Humphrey further noted that the impact of the Declaration on
world public opinion has been great if not greater than that of any con-
temporary international instrument.24
As promulgated, the Universal Declaration includes the following six
Articles that arguably could have direct relevance within the American
criminal justice system (see discussion, infra): Article I states that all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and are en-
dowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in
a spirit of brotherhood; Article III guarantees the right to life, liberty,
and security of person; Article V mandates that no one be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of any kind; Article
IX prevents arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; Article X entitles all to a
fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal in
determining rights and obligations regarding criminal charges brought
against that individual; and Article XIX guarantees the right to freedom
of opinion and expression, including the freedom to hold opinions with-
out interference, and to seek, receive, and impart information through
any media regardless of frontiers.2" United Nations' members were not
required to ratify the Universal Declaration, which in and of itself is not
legally binding, though United Nations membership is considered to be
an implicit acceptance of the principles contained therein. The United
States played a major role in the conception and drafting of the Declara-
tion but has not ratified most of the subsequent covenants and conven-
tions designed to implement the document.
23. J. ISRAEL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION (Jan.
1988) (available through AIUSA, New York).
24. Id.
25. See generally, UN. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 172 A (III) (1948).
19921
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A. Terminology and U.S. Legal Machinery
For those who are unfamiliar with public international law terminol-
ogy, a declaration (such as the U.N. Universal Declaration noted above)
is merely a general statement of intent or principle declared by a group or
organization. It is not necessarily signed, ratified or adopted by individ-
ual nations. A covenant or convention, unlike a declaration, is legally
binding on those governments that sign and ratify it. Signing a conven-
tion or covenant signifies the intent of a nation to ratify but does not bind
the nation to the agreement. Each sovereign nation-state has its own
governmental machinery of established procedures for ratification. In
the United States, our President's signature results in submission to the
Senate for final passage. The President may sign the treaty as is or may
add several declarations, reservations, or understandings to the original
form of the instrument. Reservations are statements which modify or
limit the substantive effect of one or more of the treaty provisions, which
simply clarify a matter that is generally incidental to the operation of the
treaty.26 Accordingly, after the U.N. General Assembly adopts a treaty
and opens it for signature to member nations, our Chief Executive must
initially determine whether to sign it. If he chooses to sign, the State
Department will then prepare a report based on review from the Execu-
tive Department that includes any additional recommendations. In the
Senate, the treaty is referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
for hearings and review. The Committee can accept, add to, or delete
any added declarations, reservations, or understandings before reporting
to the full Senate. The Senate must agree to ratify by a two-thirds major-
ity vote.27 If there has been any change from the initial form as submit-
ted by the President, the President may then choose to withdraw the
treaty from consideration. Assuming two-thirds consent and Presiden-
tial agreement, the treaty is then deposited with the Secretary General of
the United Nations. At this point, the treaty has international force only
if a required number of other United Nations members have also ratified.
The next step for the United States may be a reservation in order to abide
by the U.S. Constitution, in addition to implementing legislation which
converts the treaty to domestic law. This legislation must go through
both the House and Senate, with a Presidential signature necessary to
become law.
B. The United States and International Covenants
Perhaps the most authoritative definition of human rights outside of
26. R. LILLICH, U.S. RATIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, WITH OR WITHOUT RES-
ERVATION (1981); G. MOWER, THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN
RIGHT'S (1979).
27 U.S. CONST. art. II.
[Vol. 20:1
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the Universal Declaration is found in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).28 This treaty was not adopted nor
opened for adherence until 1966, and it was 1976 before the ICCPR
came into international legal force.29
The ICCPR makes more specific and binding the obligation of govern-
ments to protect the rights referred to previously in the Universal Decla-
ration. Included are such notable protections as freedom from arbitrary
deprivation of life, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, right to a fair
trial, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
The ICCPR's governing machinery is the Human Rights Committee
of the United Nations. This Committee, which reports to the Economic
and Social Council of the U.N., is an eighteen-member body elected by
the nations that have ratified the Covenant. The Human Rights Com-
mittee considers required, periodic human rights status reports which
must be submitted by all nations party to the Covenant and, also, hears
complaints issued by one state party against another. A nation that is
party to the Covenant may also adopt the optional protocol, which binds
the subject nation-state to stricter enforcement. This protocol enables
the Human Rights Committee to consider communications in closed ses-
sion from individuals who allege that they have been victims of a human
rights violation by one of the nations party to the protocol.3a
A 2nd Optional Protocol, adopted on December 15, 1989, requires
states to take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty (see
death penalty discussion, infra).3 ' This is quite an expansion from the
original ICCPR text, which prohibits the execution of juveniles (under
age 18 at time of offense) and the mentally retarded. As of March, 1990,
the following ten nations have ratified the 2nd Protocol: Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Uruguay, Luxembourg, and Costa Rica. Based on the previous history
of the United States as regards the basic ICCRP, it is unlikely that we
can expect ratification of the 2nd Protocol at any time within the near
future.
President Carter signed the ICCPR in 1977, eleven years after the
Covenant was adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly. To
date, eighty-seven countries have ratified the treaty and become party to
the Covenant; the United States is reluctant to join the ranks of the rati-
fying nations. In 1978, the President urged passage of the ICCPR which
28. G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI) (1966).
29. N. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).
30. LILLICH, supra note 26.
31. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2nd Optional Protocol, art. 1 and
1992]
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resulted in Senatorial hearings;32 however, his proposal fell victim to
problems between his Administration and Congress. According to Peter
Weiss of the Center for Constitutional Rights, the United States problem
can be described in two magic words-sovereign immunity.3" Our
Supreme Court has sanctioned the invocation of this doctrine, which es-
sentially prohibits the judicial recognition of suits brought by victims of
human rights abuses. Foreign governments and their nationals are
thereby seemingly immune from judicial reparation, and such immunity
is in keeping with U.S. diplomatic policy. Hearings on the ICCPR are
still pending, seemingly indefinitely, within the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee; however, another treaty may soon be cast among the polit-
ical spotlight-the Convention Against Torture (CAT).34
The background of the CAT can be traced to Resolution 3059, passed
in November 1973 to reject any form of torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment. Resolution 3218 followed in
1974 to launch the initial stage of a program towards setting interna-
tional standards to prevent torture. It included a clause requesting ac-
tion by future U.N. Congresses, and this action occurred in August of
1975 with the drafting of minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners
worldwide. On December 9, 1975, the United Nations issued its first
official declaration against torture, and two years later authorized the
Commission on Human Rights to draft a convention to incorporate these
concerns. Adoption of the completed Convention, an important culmi-
nation of the development of international standards against torture, was
finally accomplished in December of 1984.11
Perhaps the most significant provision of the CAT is the creation of a
committee authorized to investigate allegations of torture brought by
member nations. A panel of ten experts from a variety of nation-states
comprise the committee, which is empowered to examine periodic re-
ports from states' parties and to make inquiries into apparent systematic
practices of torture.3 6 Reports are made annually to all member states
and to the U.N. General Assembly. As of 1989, forty-one states had
ratified the CAT and an additional thirty-eight had signed, thereby evi-
dencing intent to ratify.
The United States is one of the thirty-eight, having signed the Conven-
tion on April 8, 1988. It has been submitted to the Senate Foreign Rela-
32. Human Rights Treaties, President's Message to the Senate, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
395 (Feb. 27, 1978).
33. P. Weiss, Remarks at the Amnesty International Legal Support Network National Confer-
ence at the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, University of Cincinnati Law School (Feb.
24, 1990).
34. G.A. Res. 39/46 (1984).
35. RODLEY, supra note 29, at 46-47.
36. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment, art. 17-
[Vol. 20:1
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tions Committee with a total of four declarations, three reservations and
eight understandings, which propose various qualifications on the sub-
stantive previsions. Many revisions detrimentally alter the purpose of
the treaty, including a proviso that excludes United States' participation
in almost all of the international monitoring aspects (such as the Com-
mittee Against Torture power noted supra) and a limitation which makes
the treaty unenforceable domestically unless new legislation is passed.
This limitation, which renders the treaty "non-self-executing," serves to
restrict domestic litigation though global enforcement would still be ef-
fectual. Evidently the United States, a nation that publicly proclaims
support for human rights, fears the universal jurisdiction that the treaty
would provide for, or the possible criticisms that may issue.
Pursuant to the CAT, torture is to be punished as a crime of grave
nature, and prisoners are not to be extradited to countries where they
may face torture.37 Could it be that the death penalty being in force in
the United States would be considered torture, thereby creating an inter-
national hurdle for the extradition of multinational drug cartel members
in addition to internal criminal justice concerns? We must seek the an-
swers from our executive and legislative branches. For now, it is suffi-
cient to say that, like the Declaration of Independence, this treaty creates
momentum towards the realization of the hopes that it offers. After rati-
fication, it would be universally legitimate for our nation to intercede
regarding the behavior of another country towards its citizens, thereby
eliminating the perceived need of gunboat diplomacy. The CAT further
provides for the prosecution of torturers and the right of victims to be
compensated. We should be quick to affirm these humanitarian
measures.
The United States can be proud of the recent affirmation of the Geno-
cide Convention on November 4, 1988.38 Passed as the Genocide Con-
vention Implementation Act, the new statute is to be known as the
Proximire Act on behalf of the Senator who worked for decades promot-
ing ratification. 9 The Genocide Convention aims at preventing the in-
ternational destruction of national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups and
provides for the punishment of those responsible for such acts. For the
first time, it is a crime under U.S. law to commit genocide. Such action
was not easy to come by, as evidenced by the fact that ninty-two nations
were parties to the Convention before the U.S. decided to join their
ranks.
Raphael Lemkin, in 1944, coined the word "genocide" to signify the
37. Id. art. 3-4.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1091-1093 (1988).
39. Ginger, The New U.S. Criminal Statute, The First Amendment, and the New International
Information Order, 46 NAT'L L. GUILD PRACT. 16, 17 (1989).
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horror of the Nazi Holocaust. The Greek root "genos" and Latin root
"gens" mean race of kind and occur in "genesis," "progeny," and "gene-
ology." Its suffix, "cide," derives from the Latin "caedere," meaning to
kill. Genocide is therefore the murder of a people; it is homicide directed
at the family of man. Particularly poignant for Americans, it is more
than a memory from the stories of others, Lemkin, for example, was a
Polish Jew who lost 49 family members to the Nazis. -He immigrated to
the U.S. in 1941 and was subsequently an advisor to Robert Jackson, the
U.S. Prosecutor at the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials. 4
These background points serve to introduce the Genocide Convention,
a treaty intended to place all nations on the record together against geno-
cide. Drafted over a two-year period by a United Nations Committee
chaired by U.S. Delegate John Maktos, the Convention was adopted
unanimously by the General Assembly meeting in Paris on December 9,
1948.41 On June 16, 1949, President Truman transmitted the treaty to
the Senate together with a message urging that it give its advice and con-
sent to ratification.42 There was no response. In 1953, the Eisenhower
administration withdrew support for the Convention, though the Ken-
nedy and Johnson administrations subsequently came out in favor of rati-
fication.43 On the congressional ratification process, a special committee
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended ratification in
1950 but did nothing to facilitate consideration by the full Senate. Ratifi-
cation was also recommended in 1970, 1971 and 1976, but the process
was stalemated largely due to a reluctance on the part of the American
Bar Association to endorse passage.'
Accordingly, the 1988 vote is to be considered a decisive step, albeit
long in coming, towards peace and cooperation among all nations. It is
not a giant step but yet a dramatic one in the right direction. The action
by the United States reveals our commitment to the United Nations pro-
cess and signals acceptance of U.S. responsibility to ratify and enforce
international law.
Specifically, the Proxmire Act makes it a crime for any national of the
United States to commit a variety of acts with the specific intent to de-
stroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. These acts include the
following: killing or causing serious injury to members of a group; caus-
ing permanent impairment of the mental faculties of the group using
drugs, torture, or similar techniques; subjecting the group to conditions
of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group;
40. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of The Crime of Genocide, Conflict Analy-
sis Center, Washington, D.C. (1984).
41. Id. at 3-4.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 5.
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imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and
transferring by force children of the subject group to another group.
45
No exception for wartime activity is noted, and penalties range from
twenty years to life imprisonment together with a fine of up to one mil-
lion dollars.46
The Act can be looked at as an addition to U.S. criminal law to be
used against the KKK, American Nazis, and other individuals who di-
rectly and publicly incite attacks on members of protected groups. It
must be stated explicitly that the Act does limit speech, thereby generat-
ing First Amendment issues and concerns. Therefore, existing laws of
conspiracy, fraud, libel, and Miranda warnings may come into question.
It is now criminal to say certain things under certain circumstances with
certain intent, just as previous law makes it criminal or actionable under
certain circumstances to lie, or to talk or write to further a criminal con-
spiracy.47 Current law also forbids the use of certain speech in a criminal
trial unless a confession is preceded by a warning, and unless this speech,
i.e. testimony, is ruled admissible by a judge.
In keeping with these Bill of Rights concerns, people who believe in
freedom within the United States must undertake the task of working out
how to enforce the Act. Enforcement will require a rethinking of U.S.
history, including facing the genocide committed by the U.S. government
against the many nations that were here before the Europeans arrived,
against the millions of African slaves brought here against their will, and
against the members of other protected groups subjected to human rights
exploitation throughout our past. With hard work, this process may also
lead to the acceptance of other international treaties, such as the ICCPR
and the CAT, that are now awaiting action.
The United States does have a credibility problem within the world
community in the area of human rights covenants and conventions.
Though we have played a leading role in the development of major
human rights treaties, we have declined to ratify many and have seemed
slow to recognize others. Further, serious credibility problems will arise
if, in the process of future ratification, the United States undercuts the
substance of treaties such as the CAT through the attachment of limiting
reservations and understandings. We should not fear these treaties, for
the impact of additional ratification would create many interesting op-
portunities for human rights protection within the U.S. judicial system.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (1988).
46. Id.
47. Giner, supra note 39, at 24.
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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. COURTS
A. Treaty Power and Customary International Law
Article VI, section 2, of the U.S. Constitution states that "all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding." It is well established that a self-executing
treaty, or a non-self-executing treaty implemented by Congress,
supercedes any prior inconsistent federal statutes as well as any inconsis-
tent state and local laws.4" Although customary international law is not
specifically mentioned in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has de-
clared that it is also "part of our law, and must be ascertained and ad-
ministered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determi-
nation."49 Customary international law, like treaties, supercedes any and
all inconsistent state and local laws, though the issue of federal supervi-
sion is still open for debate.
So what is this phenomenon referred to as "customary international
law?" The answer is simply unclear. What constitutes customary inter-
national law is determined in large measure by reference to state practice,
which includes, inter alia, "diplomatic acts and instructions as well as
public measures and other governmental acts and official statements of
policy... . o Widely ratified human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR,
may also contribute to the creation of specific human rights recognized
under customary international law."1 So may resolutions of international
organizations, such as the United Nations' Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, national and international judicial and arbitral decisions,
and the opinions of prominent scholars.5 2 Thus, customary international
law may prohibit incommunicado detention, unlawful arrest, and other
gross human rights abuses, depending upon the interpretation adhered to
by the presiding judge. United States courts have held, during this dec-
ade alone, that customary international law prohibits torture, 53 pro-
longed arbitrary detention, 4 and "causing [the] disappearance" of
individuals.55
The case of 17-year-old Jeolito Filartiga will perhaps provide an ap-
48. See Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
49. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
50. See generally, A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971).
51. H. HANNUM, MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 5 (1989).
52. Id.
53. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
54. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F.Supp. 887, 902 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
55. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
[Vol. 20:1
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propriate example of the use of customary international law within the
United States. Joelito disappeared from his home in Paraguay in March
of 1976. His body was later found, together with evidence of brutal tor-
ture by the Asuncion police. The Inspector General of the police fled to
the United States and was apprehended by the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service. While in detention pending deportation, Joelito's family
filed suit against him pursuant to the 1789 Judiciary Act, which provides
that federal district courts "shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort... committed in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States." 56 To make a long story short,
Chief Judge Irving Kaufman of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
found that customary international law, as reflected in a host of solemn
multilateral conventions (including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights), has come to enshrine a legal prohibition against state-sanctioned
torture. 5'
Another significant decision concerning customary international law,
Fernandez v. Wilkinson,58 considered whether the continued detention of
a Cuban who had arrived in the United States in 1980 as part of the
"freedom flotilla" violated domestic or international law. The federal
district court concluded that arbitrary detention is clearly prohibited by
customary international law and judicially remedial within the United
States, even though such cannot be said to violate the U.S. Constitution
or our statutory laws.59 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
order but based its holding on U.S. statutory provisions rather than inter-
national law. Nevertheless, the Court found it proper to "consider inter-
national law principles for notions of fairness" and noted that its
interpretation of the relevant statute is "consistent with accepted interna-
tional law principles."'
Numerous other attempts have been made over the years to invoke the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international legal in-
struments in domestic court cases. The Vietnam War generated many
61 o hcsuch decisions, most of which were largely unsuccessful in establishing
supportive judicial precedent. These imaginative efforts, however, may
someday bear fruit if domestic courts can be convinced to rethink their
traditional attitudes and adopt a more enlightened approach towards in-
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988)).
57. Schneebaum, The Enforceability of International Human Rights Norms in United States
Courts, 31 FED. B. NEWS & J. 5, 194 (1984).
58. 505 F. Sup. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
59. Id. at 798.
60. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388-90 (10th Cir. 1981).
61. See Sugarman, Judicial Decisions Concerning the Constitutionality of United States Military
Activity in Indo-China: A Bibliography of Court Decisions, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 470 (1974).
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ternational human rights claims. Certainly Filartiga and Fernandez are
innovative steps in the right direction.
A major fear that must be overcome in order for the aforementioned
end to occur is the concern that international law may unconstitutionally
enlarge the powers of the federal government or abridge constitutionally
guaranteed rights. This fear is unfounded since no treaty can override or
supersede the U.S. Constitution.62 As the Supreme Court categorically
stated in Reid v. Covert,63 "[t]here is nothing in [the Supremacy Clause]
which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not
have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.",6 Whatever
international obligations the United States may have under customary or
conventional international law, the Constitution shall prevail.
Regarding federal law, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
courts will not undertake to construe a treaty in any manner inconsistent
with a subsequent federal statute;65 however, "state law must yield when
it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty or
of an international compact or agreement." Powers of a state must give
way when they run counter to federal treaties or policies evidenced by
customary international law.66 Such invalidation of state laws should be
quite infrequent, though, due to the growing trend on the part of state
courts to extend individual rights through the use of state laws and con-
stitutions rather than by reliance on federal constitutional provisions.
Therefore, state courts provide perhaps even more fertile ground for the
utilization of international human rights law as a means of informing or
interpreting state constitutional or statutory provisions.
B. US. Criminal Justice and International Standards
Abuse of powers of arrest and detention is perhaps the most wide-
spread human rights violation in the world. It is the most common form
of repression against political opposition groups within a country, and its
use is often cloaked in the mantle of "national security" or an equivalent
phrase which seeks to excuse the purely political nature of the deten-
tion.6' Though many would argue that the Sanctuary Workers, the Wil-
mington 10, and perhaps other U.S. "political" cases would fit the above
mold, this article will not attempt to draw those type of distinctions
within the U.S. criminal justice system. Instead, it will focus on the ap-
62. H. HANNUM, supra note 51, at 8.
63. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
64. Id. at 16-17.
65. See, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962).
66. See, United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942).
67. See, Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.L. REV. 535 (1986).
68. H. HANNUM, supra note 51, at 17.
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plicability of international standards that may one day provide binding
legal authority for use in criminal cases within our court system.
The general international standard is noted in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, which gives everyone the entitlement to "liberty
and security of person." No one may be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention. Though some commentators have suggested that "arbitrary"
is the equivalent to "illegal," 69 the preferred view is that the notion of
"arbitrary" includes both procedural and substantive components. The
U.N. Commission on Human Rights has designated an arrest to be arbi-
trary if it is (a) on grounds or in accordance with procedures other than
those established by law or (b) under the provisions of a law the purpose
of which is incompatible with respect for the right to liberty and security
of person.7°
For an example of the possible application of this standard as it might
apply in North Carolina, consider the case of an officer who, without
obtaining a search warrant, enters the home of a third-party to effect an
arrest. Absent consent or exigent circumstances this officer has commit-
ted an illegal arrest, not only in violation of the Fourth Amendment but
also in violation of the ICCPR international standard. 71 Upon ratifica-
tion of the ICCPR, a motion to dismiss a charge based on said arrest
would have additional legal teeth. At least one U.S. court has already
held that prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention is directly
binding on the United States as part of customary international law, cit-
ing the ICCPR and Universal Declaration among other treaties.72
Though the ICCPR does not require the full panoply of "Miranda"
warnings mandated under our Fifth Amendment, 73 it does require that
anyone arrested be informed of the reasons for such arrest and of any
charges. 74 Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge must fur-
ther be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by
law to exercise judicial power. 75 This requirement of "promptness" has
been construed by the Human Rights Committee to require presentment
within a few days. 76 Any ratification of the ICCPR or companion trea-
ties should not effect North Carolina as regards this issue or, at least,
should not pose an inconsistency with North Carolina law. N.C. Gen-
eral Statutes Sections 15A-601 and 15A-605 impose ninety-six hour time
69. See, e.g., references contained in United Nations Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free
From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile, at 5-7 (1964).
70. H. HANNUM, supra note 51, at 17.
71. See, Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
72. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
73. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
74. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS art. 9 (2).
75. Id. art. 9 (3).
76. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8 (16) (article 9), Report of the Human
Rights Committee, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 95 (1982).
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limitations on a defendant's first judicial appearance and require advise-
ment concerning charges that have been filed against the defendant.
Challenges may be made under differing provisions applicable in other
states or jurisdictional areas, though generally prompt appearance is pro-
vided for when violations of state law are alleged.
Habeas corpus is another area where ratification should not enlarge
the rights of criminal defendants in North Carolina, nor in the United
States as a whole, unless some imaginative legal theorist could structure a
procedure whereby initial legality of detention could be challenged
through such a writ. In the United States, habeas corpus is generally
restricted to the post-trial context, with other constitutional provisions
such as the "speedy trial" guarantee of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments available to seek pre-trial relief. North Carolina has a comparable
restriction pursuant to Article 21 of the state constitution. Unlike in the
United States, international standards relating to habeas corpus are not
generally available as a means of collaterally attacking unconstitutional
or otherwise defective laws. The ICCPR and related documents restrict
habeas review to a determination of the initial legality and reasonableness
of detention and, in some circumstances, the continuing validity of deten-
tion.77 In the latter situation, international law is concerned with a de-
tention based on factors which may change over time, such as mental
illness.
The international right to a fair trial may be a more appropriate venue
for incorporation of international rights within the United States than
either prompt presentment or habeas corpus. It is an international legal
norm that every accused has the right to a "fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal."78 International instru-
ments also generally guarantee certain specific additional rights of the
accused, such as the presumption of innocence, right to counsel (ap-
pointed if necessary), and rights to expert assistance in the preparation of
a defense.7 9 These are a few of the international minimum fair trail guar-
antees, with nothing to suggest that individual nation states cannot go to
greater lengths in their attempts to protect the rights of the accused. The
remainder of this "fair trial" section will concentrate on some of these
minimum rights that have potential applicability within U.S. criminal
court.
An independent and impartial tribunal is a fundamental necessity
upon which all other fair trial rights may depend. Obviously, a tribunal
must be independent of the prosecution and defendant. The European
77. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, art. 9 (4).
78. Id. at 14 (1). Similar wording is found in the American and European Conventions on
Human Rights at articles 8 (1) and 6 (1), respectively.
79. See, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, art. 14 (2), (3);
American Convention, art. 8 (2), and European Convention, art. 6 (3).
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Court and Commission of Human Rights have made frequent reference
to the English maxim that "justice must not only be done-it must be
seen to be done." 8° Thus, an "impartial" tribunal must be composed of
members who not only exhibit no actual bias against an accused, but who
also are free from reasonable suspicion of bias because of their manner of
appointment, prior dealings with a case, etc. The United States's stan-
dards are similar, and the basic rule is a "fair trial in a fair tribunal."',
Bias must be shown through a direct, personal interest in the outcome of
a case-often extremely hard to prove. In North Carolina, our constitu-
tion provides for a court system without "favor, denial or delay."8 2 This
vague guarantee may eventually lead attorneys to international law for
supporting authority on which to base complaints, alleging the denial of
this right.
Analogous to the "independent and impartial tribunal" requirement is
the U.S. requirement that a search warrant be issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate.8 3 The police and prosecutorial officials have been
held to inherently lack the required neutrality, 4 although warrant appli-
cations are generally routinely rubber-stamped upon affidavit. Perhaps
some sort of warrant challenge based on the method of magistrate ap-
pointment or based on statistical evidence of the application/granting ra-
tio could be grounded in part on international standards and used during
a motion to suppress hearing.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have assist-
ance of counsel for his defense, but it was not until 1932 that this right
was interpreted to require the appointment of counsel for an indigent
defendant.8 5 This initially limited right to counsel in certain cases was
gradually expanded to include the right to appointed counsel in all felony
cases in federal courts and to all state felony cases via the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.86 Right to counsel now applies to
any case in which imprisonment is a possible punishment.87
International instruments specifically guarantee the right of all defend-
ants to be assisted by government-appointed counsel. The ICCPR lan-
guage relating to this issue is that court-appointed attorneys are provided
"when the interests of justice so require."88 Upon ratification, one may
apply this provision to situations other than those guaranteed in the
80. Delcourt v. Belgium, I Eur. Ct. H.R. 355 (1970).
81. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
82. N.C. CONsT. art. I § 18.
83. Jackson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
84. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
85. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
86. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
87. See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
88. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, art. 14(3)(d).
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United States. For instance, the U.S. rights to counsel are rights to coun-
sel at the trial level (and in some cases, the immediate initial appeal).
There is no constitutional right to post-conviction representation, includ-
ing motions for appropriate relief, petitions for certiorari, habeas review,
etc. Some states provide for a limited amount of representation, as with
our own North Carolina Death Penalty Resource Center. The person
who has been unjustly convicted and with new evidence can prove the
same may or may not be lucky enough to afford any attorney to assist
him. Ratification may be a tool by which he will be afforded an opportu-
nity to petition for assistance.
None of the international human rights texts now pending in the Sen-
ate explicitly require that guilt be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," a
fundamental guarantee of U.S. due process.8 9 The Human Rights Com-
mittee, however, has interpreted the ICCPR as requiring this standard
for criminal cases. 9 Nevertheless, the United States appears to offer
stronger individual protection when considering this issue; such is not
the case with the right to expert assistance.
Indigent defendants in the United States routinely petition the court
for assistance with their defense, requesting investigators, psychiatrists,
fingerprint analysts, or the like. Though the Supreme Court has stated
that "justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a
defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judi-
cial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake,"91 courts have been reluc-
tant to grant requests for assistance. The Supreme Court did, however,
provide for the appointment of a psychiatric expert in Ake v. Oklahoma,
where a defendant made a threshold showing that his sanity will be an
issue at trial.92 Decisions regarding the implementation of this right
were left to the states, and North Carolina has essentailly followed the
strict Ake rule.93 The defendant, notwithstanding the obvious disparity
of his resources as compared with the state or an affluent defendant, is
not even given his choice of experts. In North Carolina, appointment of
a fingerprint expert was finally allowed in State v. Bridges,94 where the
defendant showed not only, "specific necessity," "particularized need,"
and "significant factor in defense," but also that he could be deprived of a
fair trial without the appointment.
Although the Bridges test may be difficult to meet, but one can cer-
tainly look to international standards for support in making the neces-
sary showing. International law acknowledges "equality of arms;" this
89. H. HANNUM, supra note 51, at 9.
90. Id.
91. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
92. Id.
93. State v. Gambrell, 347 S.E.2d 390 (1986).
94. 385 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1989).
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concept highlights many questions of procedural inequality that could
jeopardize the fundamental fairness of a criminal proceeding. For exam-
ple, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of proce-
dural equality where an expert prosecution witness was granted far wider
rights to trial participation-including attendance throughout the hear-
ings and the possibility of questioning witnesses and the accused. 95
While the expert was considered to be a neutral and impartial auxiliary
of the court, a procedural violation of fundamental fairness was found to
have occurred. While not completely analogous to the situation of expert
appointment, the principle of adversarial equality reflected in the deci-
sion can be used to the advantage of the accused. Though the ICCPR or
Universal Declaration do not specifically refer to the right of expert
assistance, counsel can utilize the fair trail provisions of these instru-
ments to support the appointment of the requested expert. Financial dis-
parity alone can render a trial fundamentally unfair unless the system
under which we are operating recognizes the need for an "equality of
arms."
Ratification, also, may have profound impact on the laws of evidence
relating to search, seizure, and self-incrimination. The exclusion of im-
properly obtained evidence is not generally required under international
norms, but the requirements of a fair trial may lead to the conclusion
that the use of certain evidence has interfered with the defendant's rights.
One might attack improperly obtained evidence based on an individual's
right to privacy, together with the citation of general prohibitions against
arbitrary, unlawful, or abusive interference with privacy by the police.
96
Questions of illegal searches and seizures have arisen often in the civil
international context, but this approach does not have much supportive
international precedent.
In Malone v. UK 9 the European Court of Human Rights held that
the standards for executive-order wiretappping directed against sus-
pected ciriminals in the United Kingdom were so uncertain and obscure
that the interference with privacy could not be in accordance with the
law of the European Convention of Human Rights. The Court came to a
similar conclusion with respect to telephone metering, where numbers
called were monitored. Compare Malone to Smith v. Maryland,98 where
the use of a pen register to keep a record of telephone numbers dialed
was not considered to be a "search." The Smith case certainly appears to
be inconsistent with the international approach, and attorneys can look
95. Bonishch v. Austria, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 191 (1985).
96. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, art. 17(1).
97. 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14 (1984).
98. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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to decisions such as Malone in an attempt to bolster claims of privacy
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment.
Unfortunately, international criminal precedents have not been quite
so kind; the admission of evidence allegedly planted by the police, sur-
prise evidence, and certin types of hearsay have been held not to violate
the right to a fair trial.99 There is no specific international equivalent to
the fourth amendment "exculsionary rule," prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment."° Nor do international human rights laws address the is-
sue of sanctioning or deterring police practices, outside of awarding com-
pensation to those who rights have been violated.
International precedent supports fifth amendment violation claims in
addition to the law of arrest issues. In fact, the European Court of
Human Rights has found that statements given by a defendant to police
that were admitted at trial despite the defendant's refusal to testify
amounted to a violation of international law.101 By refusing to give evi-
dence in court, a defendant effectively prohibits the prosecution from ex-
aming him about statements given. When such statements come in
without explanation, they are often taken to be the truth by the fact-
finder. Accordingly, constitutional provisions and international prece-
dent must be cited to prohibit this evidentiary violation of individual
rights. In the United States, we have numerous hearsay exceptions that
allow certain non-testifying witness statements to come into evidence,
and we also have rules allowing admissions absent testimony. To analyze
all the possible factual circumstances would be impossible, suffice it to
say, ratification of international agreements could trigger the use of inter-
national judicial precedents that could revamp some of these hearsay and
admission rules of evidence.
A final "fair trial" area to consider is the issue of a speedy trial. The
ICCPR imposes the requirement of trial "within a reasonable time."' 2
Most jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee in cases arising
under the ICCPR concern Uruguay during its period of military control
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Committee regularly found viola-
tions of the Covenant in the context of lengthy detention without trial
under Uruguary's "prompt security measures." 103 Note that the applica-
tion of this right is not limited to those in detention; Article 14(3) of the
ICCPR requires governments to try all individuals "without undue de-
lay." This standard parallels the sixth amendment to the U.S. Con-
99. H. HANNUM, supra note 51, at 96.
100. See generally M. CURIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986).
101. See Unterpertinger v. Austria, App. No. 9120/80, Eur. Court H.R., Judgment of 24 Nov.
1986, Ser. A No. 110.
102. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, art 9(3).
103. H. HANNUM, supra note 51, at 106.
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stitutuion, which provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. North Carolina re-
cently repealed its Speedy Trial Act; however, the Sixth Amendment is-
sues may obviously still be raised.
The central issue is what amounts to a "reasonable time" or "undue
delay." This determination depends on the circumstances of each case
and includes consideration of the complexity of the case, the conduct of
the accused and the prosecution. In the case of Barker v. Wingo,' ° the
Supreme Court articulated a balancing test that identified the following
four criteria as among those that courts should consider: the length of
delay, the reason for delay, whether the defendant asserted the right to a
speedy trial, and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay.105
Ratification of the ICCPR would not necessarily change this criteria, but
the available international precedent could be used to support speedy
trial motions. An interesting question that ratification would pose would
be the issue of attachment of the sixth amendment rights to appellate
stages of a criminal case, which is provided for internationally but not
within the United States.1°6
Perhaps the most significant and far-reaching impact of ratification
upon the United States criminal justice system involves the death pen-
alty. The convoluted history of the death penalty, the Supreme Court,
due process, and the eighth amendment need not be repeated. It is signif-
icant that the United States is one of only a few nations that still legally
sanction the execution of children under the age of eighteen. Of the
thirty-seven states that permit capital punishment, fifteen (including
North Carolina) decline to impose it on 16 year-olds and twelve decline
to impose it on 17 year-olds. 10 7 Internationally recognized legal stan-
dards condemn the punishment of death for crimes of juvenile offenders
under age eighteen. Under the ICCPR, the death sentance may not be
imposed for crimes committed by persons "below eighteen years of
age."' 0 8 The Second Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, adopted on De-
cember 15, 1989, requires ratifying nations to take all necessary measures
to abolish the practice of executing minors and the mentally retarded
(which, pursuant to Penry v. Lynaugh,1° is also legal in the United
States). Finally, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child also
prohibits the execution of those under eighteen. |1 0
104. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
105. Id.
106. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
107. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 937 (1989).
108. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTs, art 6(5).
109. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
110. A. Miller, Remarks at the Amnesty International Legal Support Network National Confer-
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The effect of ratification speaks for itself. A present use value of the
above treaties exists, however, when contesting the execution of a juve-
nile within the United States. As recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1910, the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is "not fastened to the obsolete.""' A half-century later, the
Court again emphasized that the eight amendment must "derive its
meaning from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.""' 2 American society is not the only benchmark for
determining what amounts to evolving standards of decency. For exam-
ple, in Coker v. Georgia,"3 the Supreme Court noted that, as of 1965,
only three major nations in the world retained the death penalty for rape.
That international perspective served as the basis for the Coker decision
that the imposition of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman is
"cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the eight amendment." 4 In
Enmund v. Flilrida,15 the Supreme Court again turned toward the "cli-
mate of international opinion" as one basis for the determination that
imposition of a death sentence on one who had not intended to kill is
cruel and unusual punishment.
Though the constitutional issue of executing children in the United
States was settled for the immediate future in the Stanford v. Kentucky
decision,' 6 we can still utilize the laws and practices within other na-
tions, as well as the numerous international treaties, declarations, and
resolutions, to demonstrate that evolving standards of decency of a ma-
turing international community prohibit the execution of juvenile offend-
ers. We can also use these treaties in adult capital cases, though most
major international conventions do permit imposition of the death pen-
alty along strict guidelines. There does appear, however, to be a growing
international trend towards abolition." 17 Among countries for which in-
formation is available, forty-one have legally abolished the death penalty;
two have ceased it in paractice; nine have had no executions in the past
ten years; and one-hundred and fifteen retain the death penalty." 8 Of
the Western nations, only the United States retains capital punishment
during peacetime."' This number should not increase in light of the
ICCPR prohibition against reintroduction of the death penalty once it
has been abolished. Attorneys can rely on these statistics, treaties and
trends for supporting authority when raising eight amendment issues.
111. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
112. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
113. 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977).
114. Id.
115. 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).
116. 492 U.S. 937 (1989).
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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Notwithstanding Penry, future litigation concerning the issue of exe-
cuting the mentally retarded may have additional international backing.
Under many, if not most legal systems, insanity is grounds to vitiate
criminal responsibility and even to prevent trial. It is also possible for
people to become insane after conviction. In 1984, the U.N. Economic
and Social Council addressed this issue and concluded that a death sen-
tence is not to be carried out on mentally incompetent persons.12°
Other issues also abound regarding the death penalty, such as the
American Convention of Human Rights' prohibition of the execution of
defendants over age seventy, 121 and the ICCPR's ban on executing preg-
nant women. 122 How these and the many other international death pen-
alty related legalities come to effect our criminal justice system will be an
imaginative theoretical journey. Ratification of the ICCPR and/or cer-
tain other treaties with criminal law implications may answer some of the
questions, but ratification will also trigger interpretative battles that will
be waged differently in jurisdictions throughout the country. Until these
debates occur, customary international law will draw on these treaties
and international precedents for use as supplemental eight amendment
authority within the United States.
CONCLUSION
The major problem with international human rights law is that most
people know little about it. Even many of the people who do know some-
thing about it think that it really isn't law. There is a modern parallel in
the current law of civil liberties and civil rights in the United States, for
some people don't think that the Rehnquist Court is as receptive towards
civil liberties issues as was the Warren Court. These people have looked
around for alternative channels and discovered the benefit of the different
state constitutions. Lawyers are beginning to realize that rights under
state constitutions can be broader than those recognized by the Supreme
Court. Law students, however, rarely study the state constitutions, tak-
ing only a required course in federal constitutional law.
This same phenomenon is true of international human rights law.
Many law students have no idea that it exists and are certainly not versed
in the possible ways that domestic court application can occur. In the
next decade, however, legal theorists will be amazed at the amount of
international human rights groundbreaking that will be utilized in Amer-
ican courts.
We have an international bill of rights now in existence, through the
ICCPR, Universal Declaration, as well as customay international law.
120. N. RODLEY, supra note 29, at 182.
121. Id.
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We have domestic court precedent that looks to international standards.
What we don't have, however, is an unbridled adherence and commit-
ment to these global individaul civil rights milestones. Perhaps it takes a
psychoanalyst to explain why our nation, whose officials repeatedly pro-
nounce public support for human rights on an international basis, refuse
to ratify these treaties, which advance the cause of justice on a universal
scale. United States ratification is the singularly most important step for
human rights that must be taken. Although many countries have
adopted the convenants and conventions, they will not reach their full
potential to influence the behavior of governments until the United States
is a formal party. With ratification, the moral and political force of
human rights law will be strengthened. With that force, we can do more
to protect those who are imprisoned illegally, tortured, and executed.
Let not the Senate pass by this opportunity.
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